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Abstract Research on entrepreneurial ecosystems has
largely taken a macro-perspective to better conceptual-
ize and map the determinants and evolution of entrepre-
neurial ecosystems, yet has neglected the micro-level
interactions of various entrepreneurial ecosystem actors.
Recent criticisms of entrepreneurial ecosystems have
centered on the lack of explicit case and effect relation-
ships, attribution, units of analysis, the different use of
network definitions as well as the static nature of
existing frameworks. The purpose of our paper is to
present a micro level principal investigator (PI)-centered
governance framework that addresses these posited crit-
icisms and in doing so identifies the value creation
indicators (benefits), PI capabilities, the problem cate-
gories (costs), and solving mechanisms that PIs can use
to govern effectively and efficiently large-scale publicly
funded research programs. In leading such research
programs, PIs interact with different actors within entre-
preneurial ecosystems and manage governance issues,
conflicts, and tensions effectively at the micro level to
deliver the anticipated benefits and costs for each actor.
Our framework provides the basis for future empirical
research on entrepreneurial ecosystem as we have attrib-
uted cause and effect at an individual actor level and
conceptualized the governance challenges at a micro
rather than at the macro level that overcomes the static
nature of previous frameworks.
Keywords Entrepreneurial ecosystems . Principal
investigators . Governance dilemmas . Governance
mechanisms . Principal-agent theory . Problem
categories . Capabilities
JEL classification L26 . O31 . O32
1 Introduction
The literature on entrepreneurial ecosystems has identi-
fied a range of actors and supporting institutions that
encourage and support formally and informally entrepre-
neurial activities and their diffusion (Acs et al. 2014;
Colombo et al. 2015). Research on entrepreneurial eco-
systems to date has largely taken a macro perspective
and has focused on such issues as attributes (Spigel
2015), environmental factors (Suresh and Ramraj
2012), evolutionary trajectories (Mack and Mayer
2016), global innovation networks (Malecki 2011), high
growth firms (Mason and Brown 2014), environmental
sustainability (Cohen 2006), clusters, co-creation, and
appropriability (Pitelis 2012). Acs et al. (2014: 479)
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define entrepreneurial ecosystems as the Bdynamic, in-
stitutionally embedded interaction between entrepre-
neurial attitudes, ability, and aspirations, by individuals,
which drives the allocation of resources through the
creation and operation of new ventures^. Such interac-
tions between various institutions and actors within en-
trepreneurial ecosystems give rise to governance chal-
lenges including resource distribution and dealing with
conflicts related to the allocation of costs and benefits.
There is a dearth of research focusing on these issues at a
micro level, which is the focus of this paper.
Spigel (2015) argues that research on entrepreneurial
ecosystems is under-theorized and -developed. To date,
scholars have conceptualized different ways of how
entrepreneurial ecosystems evolve and develop (see
Mason and Brown 2014; Mack and Mayer 2016;
Spigel 2015, Stam 2015; Pitelis 2012). Such research
has taken a macro perspective to better conceptualize
and map the determinants and evolution of entrepre-
neurial ecosystems. Taking account of previous research
and criticisms, we adopt a different approach in concep-
tualizing entrepreneurial ecosystems by developing a
micro level conceptual framework centered around the
principal investigator (PI). The PI is an influential en-
trepreneurial ecosystem actor, whose actions and behav-
iors shape and influence the management of governance
within the entrepreneurial ecosystem that supports the
creation of new ventures with disruptive knowledge and
provides resources and capabilities for existing firms to
compete more effectively. Publicly funded PIs have to
deliver on their scientific research programs and allocate
resources efficiently and effectively as well as deal with
multiple governance systems, actors, and relationships
based on incomplete contracts. The nature of their role
means they interact, engage, and boundary span with
other entrepreneurial ecosystem actors (see Boardman
and Ponomariov 2014; Casati and Genet 2014, Kidwell
2013, 2014; Menter 2016; O’Kane et al. 2015). Increas-
ingly PIs are being mandated by publicly funded re-
search programs to participate in technology transfer
and entrepreneurial activities in collaboration with other
entrepreneurial ecosystem actors such as funding agen-
cies, venture capitalists, banks, entrepreneurs, high
growth SMEs, MNCs, etc. Some of these non-
scientific outcomes are uncertain and concerning pub-
licly funded research, outcomes are contractually based
on incomplete contracts adding further complexity to
their governance.
To manage and deal with all the governance issues
associated with large-scale publicly funded research
within entrepreneurial ecosystems (Hagendijk and
Irwin 2006), PIs need to possess certain capabilities to
navigate, arbitrate, and shape the governance mecha-
nisms of different actors and supporting institutions as
well as fulfilling their PI roles and responsibilities suc-
cessfully (see Mangematin et al. 2014). To contribute to
the overall value creation within an entrepreneurial eco-
system, PIs need to have the capabilities to allocate
resources, costs, and benefits among entrepreneurial
ecosystem actors on the basis of incomplete contracts.
PIs have an influential role in the governance of large-
scale publicly funded research through their boundary
spanning activities with entrepreneurial ecosystem ac-
tors, thus influence appropriate and effective gover-
nance mechanisms within entrepreneurial ecosystems
aimed at creating new and disruptive knowledge for
new ventures and existing firms.
To date, research on entrepreneurial ecosystems and
corresponding governance issues has mainly been driv-
en by studies of entrepreneurship and new venture cre-
ation in the private sector (see Acs et al. 2017). Existing
ecosystem frameworks have taken macro perspectives
and have neglected the dynamic role of specific ecosys-
tem actors. Our paper adds to the under-developed
entrepreneurial ecosystem literature as argued by Spigel
(2015) by focusing on the micro level principal investi-
gator governance issues of entrepreneurial ecosystem
that contribute to Bproductive entrepreneurship^ (see
Stam 2015: 1764). The contribution of this paper is
twofold. First, while previous entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems frameworks focused on the macro level, our frame-
work is at the micro level and attempts to address the
need for a more operational level understanding of
entrepreneurial ecosystem as highlighted by Stam and
Bosma (2015). Our micro level PI-centered governance
framework specifically identifies the value creation
(benefits), PI capabilities, the problem categories
(costs), and solving mechanisms that PIs can use to
govern effectively and efficiently large-scale publicly
funded research programs based on imperfect contracts.
Second, through our framework, we directly address
criticisms of entrepreneurial ecosystem attribution of
cause and effect, unit of analysis, use of different net-
work definition, and the static nature of entrepreneurial
ecosystem frameworks (see Alvedalen and Boschma
2017; Stam and Spigel 2016). By taking a micro level
perspective, our framework outlines the principal-agent
J. A. Cunningham et al.
relationships that PIs have with other ecosystem actors
as well as identifies the potential types of problem
categories that can emerge as they seek to contribute
economic and non-economic value to entrepreneurial
ecosystems. We outline and discuss the primary capa-
bilities that PIs need in order to participate and contrib-
ute to productive entrepreneurship in entrepreneurial
ecosystems for ecosystem actors as well as the alloca-
tion of costs and benefits. Based on our micro level
conceptual framework, we suggest future avenues of
research on how PIs deal effectively with conflicting
governance mechanisms that constrain their actions,
value creation activities, and the allocation of costs and
benefits to relevant entrepreneurial ecosystem actors.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 presents entrepreneurial ecosystems, the PI
role, burdens, and challenges for PIs in leading large-
scale publicly funded research projects as well as respon-
sibilities of PIs as entrepreneurial actors. Section 3 con-
siders some primary capabilities of PIs that enable them
to navigate, arbitrate, and shape different governance
mechanisms, tackle potential governance dilemmas, and
contribute to the performance of entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems. Section 4 discusses the governance of entrepreneur-
ial ecosystems and specifically boundaries of entrepre-
neurial ecosystems, incomplete contracts and resulting
governance problems, multiple principal agent relation-
ships, and the costs and benefits of governance. Section 5
outlines our PI-centered entrepreneurial ecosystem gov-
ernance framework. A final section provides some con-
cluding remarks and discusses future research avenues.
2 Entrepreneurial ecosystems and the role
of principal investigators
2.1 Entrepreneurial ecosystems
Entrepreneurship theory has highlighted exploitation ac-
tivities of entrepreneurs, yet has neglected the actual
environment of entrepreneurs opening up entrepreneur-
ial opportunities (Szerb et al. 2015). As the adequate
entrepreneurial context constitutes the basis for any en-
trepreneurial activity, i.e., due to the high context-
dependency of entrepreneurial actions, scholars intro-
duced the concept of entrepreneurial ecosystems as a
synonym for relevant factors and resources necessary
to create economic knowledge through entrepreneurial
engagement (Acs et al. 2014). The perspectives of
industrial districts (Krugman 1991; Markusen 1996),
clusters (Porter 1998), and innovation systems
(Freeman 1987; Lundvall 2010) have taken firms as the
focal point. However, Stam (2015: 1761) emphasizes
that Bthe entrepreneur, rather than the enterprise, is the
focal point [of entrepreneurial ecosystems]. The entre-
preneurial ecosystem approach thus begins with the en-
trepreneurial individual instead of the company, but also
emphasizes the role of the entrepreneurship context^.
For entrepreneurs, access to knowledge is critical and
shared through social networks (formal and informal).
These entrepreneurs are essential for maintaining and
growing the entrepreneurial system with government
support (Stam and Spigel 2016). Creating and enabling
such entrepreneurial ecosystems requires strategies as
using policy to favor incumbents, engaging with entre-
preneurs, creating an ecosystem map for further policy
strategies, and build on early successes (see Auerswald
2015). Within European cities, Audretsch and Belitski
(2016) find that culture, infrastructure, formal institu-
tions, and internet access are important factors in en-
hancing entrepreneurial ecosystems and activities.
Entrepreneurial ecosystems are evolutionary with
culture, history, and institutional settings shaping them
over time (Mack and Mayer 2016). There are different
pathways to creating entrepreneurial ecosystems and
certain actor roles are more prominent depending on
the context (Kshetri 2014). Mason and Brown (2014:
13) argue that entrepreneurial ecosystems emerge in
Bplaces that already have an established and highly
regarded knowledge base which employs significant
numbers of scientists and engineers^ and that there is
technology disruption that creates new opportunities.
Within these ecosystems, the entrepreneur interacts
with universities, which produce and disseminate new
and potentially disruptive knowledge, and new ventures
and incumbent firms, which transform and apply that
knowledge, hence constitute the nexus between science
and business. Beyond firms and research organizations,
capital providers as well as governments and public
bodies play a crucial role within entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems as they influence and shape the manner in which
entrepreneurs direct their abilities (Sölvell 2015). Vi-
brant ecosystems enable the efficient flow of knowledge
and ideas between various entities, thus form the basis
for economic and non-economic value creation that
enables Bproductive entrepreneurship.^ The outcomes
of entrepreneurial systems can thereby vary among
stakeholders (Stangler and Bell-Masterson 2015).
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Within the literature, different frameworks and
models have emerged of entrepreneurial ecosystems.
Isenberg (2011) posits six domains and twelve compo-
nents of entrepreneurial ecosystems. Whereas Spigel
(2015), using Canadian case studies, identifies ten cul-
tural, social, and material attributes of entrepreneurial
ecosystems that support entrepreneurs. Such models
take a macro perspective, hence do not address the
attribution of outcomes, costs, and benefits which is
one of the main criticisms of entrepreneurial ecosystems
(Stam 2015; Stam and Bosma 2015).
There have been critical perspectives emerging about
entrepreneurial ecosystems such as its tautological na-
ture, the missing clarity about cause and effects in rela-
tion to specific factors, units of analysis and attribution of
contributory factors for economic outcomes (Stam and
Spigel 2016). Alvedalen and Boschma (2017) note sev-
eral deficits of existing frameworks including a lack of
explicit cause and effect relationships, the use of different
network definitions, the place-/ cluster-based nature of
empirical studies to date as well as the static nature of
existing frameworks that do not account for the evolution
over time. Furthermore, Stam and Bosma (2015) empha-
size that the operational level of entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems has yet to be addressed adequately in the literature.
Given the challenges of attributing costs and benefits to
entrepreneurial ecosystems, Stangler andBell-Masterson
(2015) suggest density, fluidity, connectivity, and diver-
sity as vibrancy indicators.
Existing entrepreneurial ecosystem models have
identified the importance of skilled labor and the role
of university and publicly funded research. Our focus is
at the individual level and extends the entrepreneur
focus of Stam (2015). Within publicly funded large-
scale research projects, the PI takes over the described
entrepreneurial role with their funded project forming
the nucleus around an imperfect contract. Kuratko and
Menter (2017: 45) consequently characterize PIs as
entrepreneurial ecosystem actors who Bcreate conducive
environment themselves as well as with the help of
political programs and consequently build the breeding
ground for further entrepreneurial action^. The PI en-
gages in bothmanaging different stakeholders for public
science, but also in designing, resourcing, and deliver-
ing large-scale publicly funded projects, arbitrating and
attempting to distribute the costs and returns for relevant
entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. The emerging litera-
ture on PIs describes them as scientific entrepreneurs
who shape new paradigms, reshape the boundaries of
organizations, and span boundaries between the public
and private sector (Casati and Genet 2014; Mangematin
et al. 2014), thus strive for mutual beneficial outcomes
that can enhance economic and non-economic value
around disruptive knowledge (McAdam et al. 2012).
In an ideal entrepreneurial ecosystem, public research
outputs would complement industry inputs and result in
efficient processes and satisfactory outcomes that under-
pin productive entrepreneurship. The reality looks differ-
ent, as basic research, e.g., from universities, does not
directly diffuse in marketable product or process innova-
tions, as suggested by the linear model of innovation
(Leyden andMenter 2017). Academia and industry often
pursue divergent or even conflicting targets and are si-
multaneously affected by their regional endowment and
corresponding governance mechanisms imposed by gov-
ernment (Lehmann and Menter 2016): whereas universi-
ties and research institutions might be interested in the
disclosure of new knowledge through publications, in-
dustry might target the protection and commercialization
of intellectual property. PIs have to align those opposing
objectives, outweigh financial and scientific interests, and
strive for efficient processes despite contrary objectives of
the individual actors (Nambisan and Baron 2013). In
dealing with such conflicts and constraints, this then
creates an array of managerial challenges for PIs particu-
larly at the project level (see Cunningham et al. 2015a).
2.2 The PI role and activities in complex
multi-stakeholder public research projects
Scientists in the principal investigator role are part of the
entrepreneurial ecosystem. As the changing nature of in-
dividual academic roles (Slaughter and Leslie 1997) and
the evolution of entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz
1983, Guerrero et al. 2015) are blurring the boundaries
between science and business; the role-identity of scientists
is being modified (Jain et al. 2009; Lam 2010). This
paradigm shift results in the emergence of a new identity
in the scientific community. Scientists are awarded re-
search funding for the detailed interpretations and project
plans that are disruptive and original in nature that can
contribute to productive entrepreneurship for ecosystem
actors. In the PI role, scientists take on management roles
in the governance, implementation, and realization of
large-scale publicly funded research programs. Thus, in
formulating and delivering on public research programs,
PIs are becoming influential agents of economic and social
change.Mangematin et al. (2014: 2) summarize the PI role
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and relevance as follows: BThey play a specific role in the
new governance of research as they are the ones who
design research projects and manage their implementation.
[…] These new roles also involve coordinating with mul-
tiple organizations, including industry partners, and gener-
ally making the job of the principal investigator more
important and policy relevant^.
There are growing empirical studies of scientists in the
PI role. For a scientist, becoming a PI is a career enhanc-
ing and offers a real opportunity to shape activities with
respect to science and markets as well as research produc-
tivity (Feeney and Welch 2014). The PI role provides
scientists with status within the academic community
and an additional allocation of resources that has the
potential to contribute to economic and non-economic
value of entrepreneurial ecosystems (see O’Kane et al.
2015). It provides opportunities for scientists to work and
engage with other scientists in academic, public research,
and industrial organizational settings and to build their
own research teams and networks. Taking on the PI role
for a scientist means that they are taking on additional
responsibilities and roles that are necessary to provide the
basis of disruptive knowledge that contributes to
productive entrepreneurship. It also requires PIs to
remove constraints that prevent entrepreneurship and
innovation. In achieving this, Cunningham et al. (2016)
identified ten types of responsibilities and roles of PIs who
simultaneously act as scientists, research strategists, pro-
ject managers, team leaders, knowledge brokers, admin-
istrators, stakeholder managers, project promoters, re-
source managers, supervisors, and mentors, indicating
the complexity of PIs’ tasks. In essence, the PI, as
Boehm and Hogan (2014) argue, is akin to an entrepre-
neur and needs to be a Bjack of all trades^ to manage
complex multi-stakeholder relationships. Moreover, they
suggest that PIs are even better placed to manage the gap
between industry and academic environments. PIs are
knowledge brokers who create value by bridging structur-
al holes and building trust between the lab and industry
through four distinct activities: extrapolation, seeking,
aligning, and anticipating (Kidwell 2013).
PIs are highly strategic in choosing their institutions
in order to progress their research agenda and they
actively seek environments that support and value their
research activities and ambitions (Kidwell 2014). They
seek out suitable entrepreneurial contexts or places that
have vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystems (Auerswald
2015). PIs being a Bjack of all trades^ means they can
create knowledge and novelty that new ventures can use
and exploit, manage governance issues and relation-
ships effectively, contribute to productive entrepreneur-
ship, arbitrate the costs and benefits to each shareholder,
and contribute to the economic and non-economic value
creation of entrepreneurial ecosystems. PIs challenge
systems and processes (Kidwell 2014) and are non-
conformists (O’Kane et al. 2015) who can subvert gov-
ernance systems and rules.
Micro institutional conditions and supports do influ-
ence the PIs’ academic entrepreneurship decision-
making and high levels of trust between all stakeholders
are critical and essential (Organ and Cunningham 2014).
PIs can also make the deliberate decision to leave a
university setting to set up their own firm so that they
can enhance their sphere of influence and use it as a
mechanism to shape their research agenda and the mar-
ket opportunity (Baglieri and Lorenzoni 2014). Based on
a study of five PIs, Baglieri and Lorenzoni (2014) show
how PIs positioned themselves closer to the market that
enabled them to provide roadmaps and identify customer
needs as well as actively participate in the value creation
process. Moreover, Casati and Genet (2014) argue that
PIs are scientific entrepreneurs that engage in
envisioning, value creation, and resourcing actions. They
further argue that PIs shape their environment and have
the entrepreneurial characteristic to engage in science
and the external environment. Furthermore, PIs with
proactive postures challenge existing technology trajec-
tories and shape new ones (O’Kane et al. 2015). The
actions and approaches of scientists in the PI role for
publicly funded research thereby contribute to the vi-
brancy and development of entrepreneurial ecosystems.
2.3 Challenges and burdens for PIs of publicly funded
large-scale research projects
For scientists, becoming a PI places additional respon-
sibilities with respect to governance, leadership, and
management of large-scale public science projects on
them. With respect to the governance of publicly funded
scientific programs, PIs are responsible for all scientific
and financial aspects of their projects (see Cunningham
et al. 2016). Their day-to-day responsibilities include
research leadership and management of the project,
dealing with internal and external stakeholders (TTOs,
entrepreneurs, funders etc.) as well as supervising and
mentoring researchers to ensure that the overall project
deliverables are met. Given the additional responsibili-
ties concerning leadership and management,
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Cunningham et al. (2016: 71) note that Ball of this is to
be achieved within as many as three layers of control
mechanisms, including their own institution, the public
funding agency and the project-specific controls^.
The managerial activities and burdens that scientists
in the PI role face can be extensive. Cunningham et al.
(2015a) found that PIs experienced three main catego-
ries of managerial challenges—project management,
project adaptability, and project network manage-
ment—and they used a variety of approaches to deal
with these challenges. They found that PIs are more
deeply involved in project operational management
and intensively involved in science brokering activities
and that the managerial role has a low status among PIs.
In their study of a sample of US research centers,
Boardman and Ponomariov (2014) find that PI manage-
ment know-how is not equal and this raises interesting
questions about the impact on research productivity.
Furthermore, Boehm and Hogan (2014) argue the need
for PIs to have a broader commercial understanding and
awareness that supports boundary spanning activities,
particularly inter-organizational ones. In their study on
entrepreneurial performance of PIs and company
culture, Del Giudice et al. (2016) emphasize that nation-
al culture can influence PIs’ orientation toward
entrepreneurship.
In discharging their project responsibilities PIs expe-
rience barriers or what Cunningham et al. (2014) de-
scribe as inhibiting factors that can hinder the realization
of their scientific vision and ambition as well as out-
comes for other ecosystem actors. They identified three
levels of inhibitors: political and environmental, institu-
tional, and project inhibitors. In particular, the institu-
tional inhibitors centered on dedicated technology trans-
fer support, tailored support for the PI role, and human
capital support. These impeded the operational manage-
ment for PIs and highlighted core tensions of the role
between research management and leadership.
2.4 Responsibilities of PIs as entrepreneurial actors
To survive in a shifting public research environment that
increasingly rewards academic entrepreneurship,
knowledge translation, and economic impact, PIs are
adopting the role of scientific entrepreneurs. Consistent
with this view, many of the tasks now undertaken by PIs
have expanded beyond scientific avenues and resemble
those of traditional entrepreneurs. For example, there is
increasing acknowledgement that PIs contribute to
industry growth (Audretsch and Stephan 1996; Zucker
et al. 2002), acquire capital and resources (Forti et al.
2013; Kidwell 2013), and act as inventors and market
shapers (Baglieri and Lorenzoni 2014; Casati and Genet
2014; Murray 2004) as well as boundary spanning
agents who connect scientific inquiry, innovation, and
industry (Boehm and Hogan 2014; Gittelman and
Kogut 2003). Added to this, a number of scholars have
emphasized the research management duties associated
with the PI role (Adler et al. 2009; Boardman and
Ponomariov 2014), while Etzkowitz (2003) refers to
research groups that are led by PIs as Bquasi-firms.^
Moreover, the PI role involves significant coordination
among entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. The expansion
of the role and activities beyond traditional scientific
leadership has created a new tension for scientists, par-
ticularly around governance asMangematin et al. (2014:
2) describe: BIn the new governance of science and
universities, principal investigators have increased re-
sponsibility as scientific fiduciaries. The legal and the
informal responsibilities entailed in the financial man-
agement of research pose new administrative challenges
for the principal investigator, requiring them to measure
carefully the balance of research management and re-
search leadership in their approach to their principal
investigator mission. Can they, simultaneously, be en-
trepreneurs and administrators?^
In summary, publicly funded PIs are entrepreneurial
actors within entrepreneurial ecosystems and in the cre-
ation of disruptive knowledge and productive entrepre-
neurship. PIs can contribute to economic and non-
economic value through fulfilling their PI role and the
associated responsibilities. Hence, PIs are involved in
engaging and interacting with a wide range of entrepre-
neurial ecosystem actors and they have to deal with
complex governance issues based on an imperfect con-
tract. The PI role, while it gives scientists a status within
their academic community, also imposes an entrepre-
neurial mandate as well as a governance mandate that is
required to contribute to productive entrepreneurship.
3 Primary capabilities of PIs in contributing
effectively to governance of entrepreneurial
ecosystems
To contribute effectively to the economic growth of
entrepreneurial ecosystems and productive entrepre-
neurship, PIs need to possess capabilities that bridge
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the expectations of different actors. Sölvell (2015: 89f.)
describes potential conflicts within entrepreneurial eco-
systems as follows: BSmall firms who believe they have
something new exciting to offer have a hard time meet-
ing with the right people at a large firm. Large firms
searching for a new supplier are more likely to look for
an established international supplier than go searching
among innovative SMEs located right under their nose.
Policymakers often have only vague ideas about what
business really needs. Researchers are more interested in
academic publishing than commercializing their new
findings. […] Entrepreneurs find it difficult to persuade
banks to invest in new innovative businesses^. PIs need
to be a Bjack of all trades^ (see Boehm and Hogan
2014), having primary capabilities that enable them to
address the specific needs of different actors and con-
tribute to the actors’ value creation processes through
economic and non-economic ends. To attain this, PIs
proactively drive innovation, primarily through knowl-
edge and create value by simultaneously interacting
with a multitude of actors (O’Kane 2016). It is the PIs’
competency and experience that contributes to the effi-
cient and effective value creation processes. Taking the
growing body of empirical studies of PIs, we identify
some of the primary capabilities that PIs need to possess
in order to effectively shape governance relationships
that ultimately enhance the overall value of an entrepre-
neurial ecosystem.
3.1 Researcher and scientific excellence
Being an excellent researcher is a central capability that
funded PIs need to have in order to be successful in
leading large-scale publicly funded projects that involve
academic and industry partnerships (Cunningham et al.
2015b). This is evaluated through peer review process-
es, where the project ideas as well as the scientific track
record of the PI and associated research teams and
partners are evaluated and assessed as well as the po-
tential impacts beyond scientific ones. In their study of
French PIs, Casati and Genet (2014: 16) term the dem-
onstration of scientific excellence as Bproducing
science^ meaning that BPIs ‘produce’ science, technol-
ogies and innovation and the outputs of their activity are
measurable^. Some PIs seek public funding to pursue
existing scientific trajectories and build on the scientific
excellence that they have created while others open new
scientific trajectories (see O’Kane et al. 2015). PIs’
scientific work is focused around problem-based
activities, providing some solutions and answers for
policymakers (Mangematin et al. 2014).
3.2 Research leadership
Becoming a PI places additional research leadership and
managerial responsibilities on scientists. PIs need to
have a capability in both to ensure that they comply
with different governance and control mechanisms of
various entrepreneurial ecosystem actors such as
funding agencies, their own institution and any industry
or enterprise partners. Research leadership capabilities
relate to ensuring that the funded project delivers the
desired scientific outcomes, whereby the PIs’ capabili-
ties are leading and coordinating scientific outcomes
typically across a number of academic and now increas-
ingly industry partners (see Cunningham et al. 2015a),
based on imperfect contracts. The role of the PI is to
provide academic leadership. The foundation of this
research leadership is achieved through their scientific
excellence and track record.
3.3 Managerial responsiveness
Cunningham et al. (2015a, 2015b) posit that the PI role
has become managerial in nature in terms of the core
functions of management (planning, leading, organiz-
ing, and controlling). PIs not alone become academic
leaders but are viewed as institution leaders. PIs need to
have research managerial capabilities to deal effectively
with a variety of activities related to finance, human
resources, legal, intellectual property (IP), etc. to suc-
cessfully deliver publicly funded research projects. Part
of their managerial responsibility is to ensure that all
members of the funded project are compliant with re-
search ethics and professional body requirements. The
managerial tasks and challenges for PIs focus on project
management, project adaptability, and network chal-
lenges (see Cunningham et al. 2015a). Based on their
study of Irish PIs, Cunningham et al. (2014) found that
the balance for PIs is more on research management and
less on research leadership. PIs are in essence CEOs of
temporary organizations within their own institution
(see Mangematin et al. 2014). Managerial responsive-
ness thus means that PIs have to deal with core mana-
gerial tensions and changing conditions and objectives:
entrepreneurial versus scientific outputs; balancing
existing workloads versus applying for new funding
opportunities; IP protection versus IP exploitation;
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project sustainability versus continual loss of talents and
experiences; researchmanagement versus research lead-
ership; managing power of collaboration partners. With
respect to entrepreneurial ecosystems, this capability
ensures that allocated resources—as well as associated
costs—are deployed, managed, and utilized in a manner
that can maximize economic and non-economic value
creation that meets the demands and anticipated benefits
of different actors within governance systems.
3.4 Resource acquisition
One of the core capabilities of a PI is to secure both hard
and soft resources to realize their scientific missions or
as Kidwell (2014: 34) describes Bthey must steer their
careers in ways that position them to accomplish their
research agenda with appropriate resources^. The hard
resources typically center on equipment and lab space to
conduct their research. Soft resource support is usually
focused on institutional support for the PI role and
associated activities. This means in effect that PIs have
support from various functions within their institutions
to effectively and efficiently deliver the publicly funded
programs and to be able to simultaneously engage with
different actors within an entrepreneurial ecosystem.
Being an effective resource acquirer means that the PI
has the necessary threshold resources (hard and soft) in
order to deliver against stated objectives for publicly
funded projects. This capability also supports the PI to
realize more autonomy and research space to conduct
their research and related activities. It also means that
the PI has the necessary resources that can have the
potential to contribute to value creation for other entre-
preneurial ecosystem actors.
3.5 Boundary spanning and relationship building
Empirical studies to date on PIs have consistently
highlighted the need for PIs to be capable with respect
to building relationships internally and externally to
their own institutions with multiple partners and have
the ability to boundary span. Specifically, Boehm and
Hogan (2014) highlight the need for PIs to build sus-
tainable and effective inter-organizational relationships
and to develop good personal relationships between
research and industry partners. Casati and Genet
(2014) found that PIs were involved in brokering sci-
ence where they were transferring knowledge and ex-
pertise across domains and organizational settings as
well as forming new networks. PIs need to have bridg-
ing capabilities between science and industry. As part of
their boundary spanning activities and capabilities, PIs
are open to collaborating with a wide variety of partners
that help them to realize their scientific mission (Kidwell
2014; O’Kane et al. 2015). Such boundary spanning
activities can enhance existing value creation or create
new streams of economic and non-economic value for
individual entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. This capa-
bility also contributes to good governance and relation-
ships that are necessary for the functioning of entrepre-
neurial ecosystems.
3.6 Envisioning, strategizing, and value creation
Envisioning, strategizing, and value creation constitute
three complementary capabilities that PIs need to pos-
sess. First, PIs are visionaries as they have a capability to
have a clear vision of their scientific mission over the
long term. Being visionary means that they appropriate
resources and engage with different stakeholders in
order to realize this scientific mission (Kidwell 2014).
Casati and Genet (2014: 16) describe this envisioning as
a dimension that Brepresents PIs’ medium and long
terms scientific vision and perspectives, and includes
how they frame their overall scientific ambition as series
of projects which match the requirements of public
authorities^. Strategizing is about how to realize their
scientific vision and mission. O’Kane et al. (2015) find
that PIs strategize constantly with some PIs being more
strategic and selective in relation to competing for pub-
lic funding. This requires PIs to balance short-term goals
and operational demands against realizing the longer-
term scientific vision and mission. Moreover, in their
strategizing, PIs are creating alignment and synergies
between their research, its application and the market
place (see Cunningham et al. 2016). Value creation and
capture is finally realized by PIs being able to link and
exploit synergies between academic and user domains.
4 The governance of entrepreneurial ecosystems
Due to the inherent structure of entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems and the fact that ecosystems are not formalized
institutions or organizations but rather an informal plexus
of relations between individuals, institutions, and organi-
zations, often based on regional proximity, it seems to be
impossible to develop a theory-based holistic framework
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for the governance of entrepreneurial ecosystems. Similar
to clusters, entrepreneurial ecosystems are characterized
by relational governance mechanisms and a lack of hier-
archical structures as well as clear expressions of expec-
tances, responsibilities, and objectives (Spigel 2015).
Stam (2015) argues that entrepreneurial ecosystems are
not comparable to classical market (failure) situations and
consequently the classical Bgovernance modes,^ namely
the both extremes Bmarket^ and Bhierarchy,^ are not
sufficient in a discussion of mechanisms minimizing
costs. Rather, the opportunity of creating a higher overall
value justifies the important role that entrepreneurial eco-
systems play in the welfare of regions and countries (Acs
et al. 2014). Measuring the value created by an entrepre-
neurial ecosystem is only possible if firstly the boundaries
of the ecosystem are defined and subsequently costs and
benefits within the ecosystem but also arising conflicts
between actors inside and spatially proximate, indirectly
affected actors outside the ecosystem are identified and
taken into account. The subsequent discussion of prob-
lems and solving mechanisms and multiple principal-
agent relationships demonstrates whether and in what
manner PIs can add value by managing the governance
of entrepreneurial ecosystems.
4.1 The boundaries of the entrepreneurial ecosystem
as a nexus of incomplete contracts and resulting
governance problems
In order to be able to explain and quantify the added
value created by the entrepreneurial ecosystem, the
definition of the boundaries of the ecosystem is an
essential requirement. Stam and Spigel (2016) define
entrepreneurial ecosystems Bas a set of interdependent
actors and factors coordinated in such a way that they
enable productive entrepreneurship within a particular
territory .^ Even though entrepreneurial ecosystems are
not clearly delimited organizational constructs, they
show the same properties, underlying conditions and
problems like other organizations. As markets are im-
perfect, especially not frictionless and characterized by
missing market transparency as well as irrational behav-
ior of the participants, the extent of transaction costs
dominates the composition of relationships between the
different market players. Depending on the specification
of transactions and products, contracts that can be one-
time or repeating are concluded. Consequently, transac-
tion costs, especially search and information as well as
bargaining and enforcement costs, determine the
boundaries of organizations. These universal implica-
tions from transaction cost theory (for a broader
discussion see Coase 1937; Williamson 1985, 1989)
hold for entrepreneurial ecosystems that can conse-
quently be considered as a nexus of contracts (Jensen
and Meckling 1976). Due to the fact that these contracts
cannot specify every imaginable situation and resulting
decision or action alternative, they can be described as
incomplete by nature. Consequently, implicit and ex-
plicit, but still incomplete, multiple contracts exist be-
tween distinct entrepreneurial ecosystem actors.
As entrepreneurial ecosystems generate complex and
multifarious outputs and with reference to the assump-
tion that knowledge spillovers arise from these ecosys-
tems (Acs et al. 2009), externalities can lead to unde-
sired behaviors like free-riding. In the case that property
rights are not enforceable or other interested parties are
not automatically excluded from benefits, the incentives
of involved actors can be influenced and consequently
the overall output can be reduced for the whole commu-
nity (Alchian and Demsetz 1973). Due to the fact that
the allocation of resources within the entrepreneurial
ecosystem directly affects the evaluation of related costs
and benefits, renegotiations and underinvestment can
jeopardize the inherent value of and productive capital
in the ecosystem. Consequently, the organizational arti-
fact Bentrepreneurial ecosystem^ is comprehensible un-
der the following two conditions. Firstly, a functioning
and efficient governance system should ensure that all
stakeholders contributing to value creation within the
ecosystem receive a return on the collaboratively created
value they expected. Secondly, contributing to the eco-
system is only reasonable if the created value within the
ecosystem is higher than the sum of all values potential-
ly created by actors without their involvement in the
ecosystem, i.e., overall benefits exceed the overall costs
within the ecosystem. Conflicting interests and prob-
lems arising from incomplete contracts and self-
interests lead to imbalances and can destroy the expect-
ed value. How PIs can contribute to solve these prob-
lems is discussed in the following section.
4.2 Multiple-principal agent relationships and the costs
and benefits of governance mechanisms within an
entrepreneurial ecosystem
Generally, the incomplete contract approach focuses on
single relationships and single tasks; nevertheless, it also
fits to describe corporate governance dilemmas in
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entrepreneurial ecosystems by construing them as a nexus
of incomplete contracts (see Zingales 1998). The sur-
rounding of entrepreneurial ecosystems is challenging
because of incomplete information about the risks of
projects on the one hand and the high requirements
concerning the definition and formulation of project goals
on the other hand. As publicly funded research projects
are naturally complex and multifaceted, the mentioned
challenges can potentially endanger the success of the
whole project. Additionally, the abovementioned stake-
holders have a self-interest and try to influence or control
the project. To overcome these problems, PIs can serve as
project managers and enforcers of all legitimate interests
by reason of their capabilities.
Taking the perspective of the principal-agent theory
helps to analyze asymmetric information and conse-
quences in (contractual) relationships between individ-
uals (Jensen and Meckling 1976). From a principal-
agent perspective, PIs are acting as an agent for all actors
within the entrepreneurial ecosystem, what leads to
multiple agency roles. This circumstance requires the
consideration of multiple governance roles of the PI in
the entrepreneurial ecosystem and consequently the ex-
istence of different sets of agency costs (Filatotchev
et al. 2011). PIs are agents in response of the overall
project, assigned and contracted to balance interests and
competing claims within the ecosystem. Within their
role as an agent, PIs bridge the expectations, thus meet
the primary objectives of various actors and constantly
signal progress and results to entrepreneurial ecosystem
actors, to ultimately contribute to economic and non-
economic value creation processes within entrepreneur-
ial ecosystems.
With regard to information asymmetries, the gover-
nance literature distinguishes two different problem cat-
egories depending on the status of the contract: Badverse
selection^—problems as the result of Bhidden
characteristics^ before the parties reach an arrangement
(ex ante), and Bmoral hazard’—problems which describe
Bhidden actions^ and Bhidden information^ after
contracting (ex post) (Arrow 1984). Both, the principal
and the agent, are interested in a reduction of information
asymmetries. The agent uses Bsignaling^ to persuade the
principal that he/she has the best intentions and his/her
statement about his/her characteristics is true, whereas the
principal uses Bmonitoring^ to control the agent’s ac-
tions. Holmström (1979) and others showed that any
additional information improves the welfare of the prin-
cipal and the agent (see Stiglitz 1975; Williamson 1975).
Especially in an entrepreneurial environment where pro-
ject outcomes are often exposed to high risks, informa-
tion asymmetries between the principal and the agent
undermine the creation of economic and non-economic
value within entrepreneurial ecosystems.
To overcome or at least minimize information
asymmetries, thus increasing the efficiency of value
creation processes, the principal has to evaluate and
assess the signals which are sent out by the agent to then
decide on whether to enter into bilateral (contractual)
relationships or not. In an entrepreneurial ecosystem, for
example, the PI acts as an agent for public capital
providers such as public research funding agencies.
Before a scientist can take on the PI role and is enabled
to act as an agent for a public funding agency, a peer
evaluation focuses on scientific merits, capabilities to
manage the funding project proposed and whether the
project has sufficient organization support to be an
effective agent for the funding agency. In general, im-
perfect information about individuals’ characteristics
can conclude in unbalanced negotiation power and ends
up in an incomplete contract and a dissatisfying rela-
tionship for both partners (Zingales 1998). Reduced
efforts and a suboptimal allocation of resources finally
lead to a project outcome that is under its potential
value, resulting in a loss of welfare.
In a complex environment as prevalent in entrepre-
neurial ecosystems, monitoring as well as signaling
mechanisms are difficult to establish (Freitas et al.
2013). Signaling and monitoring activities might there-
by take various forms. Entrepreneurs could for example
use their personal networks and strong ties to business
angels to signal their good reputation to get funding
(Elitzur and Gavious 2003), and funding agencies could,
for example, install a simple monitoring system for the
PI such as a quarterly reporting system. However, the
PI’s task areas are multifaceted. According to Audretsch
et al. (2009), the classical private entrepreneur has a dual
role: leveraging the existing resources of the business as
well as bringing in human capital to the innovation
process. Beyond these tasks, the PI as a public sector
entrepreneur has to additionally execute many more
functions such as supervising and mentoring, managing
cultural diversity, or project promotion (Cunningham
et al. 2016). The PI as well as the funding agency would
agree that managing all involved stakeholders is one of
the PI’s key responsibilities. But how should the PI
credibly report the importance of a research meeting or
think tank without any physical output? Especially trust
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building activities between the PI and the other key
actors in entrepreneurial ecosystems are necessary to
ensure that the PI can use its capabilities to create value.
Besides the possibility to control the agent, the prin-
cipal can install incentive mechanisms like performance-
related remuneration. It is a fact that the allocation of
property rights and the distribution of tasks, also known
as the separation of ownership and control, is the origin
of all governance dilemmas, but otherwise can be part of
the solution. Giving agents ownership shares as part of
their remuneration is a common method to align their
interests with the interests of the principal-owner.
Demsetz (1967) emphasizes that property rights have
an incentive as well as a reward component, which both
can universally be used in economic settings and are
beneficial in contract theory, too. In large-scale publicly
funded research projects, property rights matter, but
more in terms of intellectual property rights and specific
knowledge than in equity stakes. Stephan and Levin
(1996: 177) examine reward structures of university-
based scientists and conclude that Bbasic science is fos-
tered by a mechanism of reputational rights; technolog-
ical advances—and the products and processes they
produce—are fostered by a mechanism of property
rights^. Individual incentives to engage in the transfer
of innovation, i.e., the Bprivatization^ of knowledge, as
well as the opportunities of commercialization are based
on sufficient intellectual property rights.
5 PI-centered entrepreneurial ecosystem governance
framework
PIs have to simultaneously maintain relationships with
many stakeholders within one single project and all
stakeholders have self-interest in realizing value. Trust
in the capabilities of the PI as well as between the
different actors of the entrepreneurial ecosystems can
make controlling and monitoring mechanisms superflu-
ous or can at least lead to a reduction of respective
mechanisms. Focusing on strategic tools that keep an
overview on the macro level instead of focusing on
single actors and relations can help to ensure target
achievement and value creation. Using a modified mod-
el of the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1995)
thereby helps the PI to govern the entrepreneurial eco-
system successfully and supports him/her in his/her key
role constituting the connective link in publicly funded
large-scale research programs.
PIs take an active role in the governance system of an
entrepreneurial ecosystem. They are part of their insti-
tutional monitoring system as their entrepreneurial con-
tribution to the project is essential for the overall eco-
nomic and non-economic value creation. Therefore, a
detailed discussion about the PI and their relation to
other stakeholders in research projects against the back-
ground of the principal-agent theory sheds light on
common governance dilemmas. As PIs engage with a
variety of actors within entrepreneurial ecosystems, they
have to navigate different governance mechanisms and
deliver a variety of benefits and outcomes such as dis-
ruptive knowledge. From a governance perspective,
they have to deal with different problem categories
resulting from information asymmetries. To be effective
and to contribute to efficient governance, PIs need to
possess a certain set of primary capabilities that enables
them to bridge and overcome prevalent gaps and obsta-
cles between science and business. Drawing this togeth-
er, we present a PI-centered entrepreneurial ecosystem
governance framework that integrates actors that PIs
need to deal with, the primary capabilities they need to
possess in order to deliver against the principal’s prima-
ry interests, the problem categories associated with re-
spective bilateral governance relationships as well as
related solving mechanisms, to comply with actors’
monitoring mechanisms as well as contribute to the
economic and non-economic value creation and capture
for entrepreneurial ecosystem actors (see Fig. 1).
It is the PI’s research excellence and leadership that
enable PIs to effectively pursue their scientific mission,
coordinate various actors within the scientific field, and
deliver publicly funded research programs successfully
and on time. The focus of PIs is on scientific value
creation and the compliance with respective scientific
research objectives. Despite potentially diverging objec-
tives—universities are interested in research income and
royalties whereas PIs primarily strive for personal repu-
tation and prestige—it is the PI’s research excellence
and leadership which facilitate the simultaneous
achievement of both targets and the satisfactory resolu-
tion of potential conflicts. It is obvious that, due to the
iterative and dynamic nature of publicly funded large-
scale projects, the PI’s role as well as the importance and
involvement of different entrepreneurial ecosystem ac-
tors change over time. In the early stages of project
acquisition, PIs act like a principal and decide which
research ideas are pursued, how research should techni-
cally be organized and the nature of the disruptive
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knowledge. In involving other ecosystem actors, they
allocate costs and benefits, with some of these costs
being covered by the funding received. The PI becomes
a resource allocator. When funding of a project is
granted, the PI is responsible for the design and imple-
mentation of an overall project governance system and
as the project progresses they have to monitor the allo-
cation of costs and benefits for each entrepreneurial
ecosystem actor. Due to their drive for academic prestige
and enhanced reputation, PIs often choose to apply for
and engage in very complex multi-stakeholder projects,
which are difficult to coordinate. Their boundary
spanning and relationship building capabilities enable
PIs to successfully deliver on the respective principals’
objectives and leverage diverse inputs of various stake-
holders efficiently.
As entrepreneurial environment actors, research or-
ganizations serve as the natural setting of PIs, provide
resources, and control the application, incentives, and
rewards. Besides financial outcomes such as royalties
and research income, universities are interested in sci-
entific outcomes such as scientific publications as well
as human capital development. Additionally, reputation
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government and other institutions. Due to the fact that
the relationship between the PI and the university is
long-term orientated, Badverse selection’ problems play
a tangential role. Rather, moral hazard problems arise
from the PI’s hidden actions and hidden intensions.
Resources can be wasted or distributed in an inefficient
way; therefore, there are less benefits potentially occur-
ring to other entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. Further-
more, PIs might have an interest in not disclosing new
knowledge and technological breakthroughs, i.e., by-
pass formal technology transfer systems (Menter
2016). In order to prevent respective activities, univer-
sities need to provide institutional resources that PIs
require and reduce the administrative burdens associated
with the disclosure of innovations. The university might
additionally establish monitoringmechanisms to control
the PI over at least three main dimensions: First, finan-
cial reporting to ensure an optimal allocation of re-
sources. Second, Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs)
offer IP protection and efficient technology transfer
mechanisms to facilitate the commercialization of
knowledge. PIs are required to adhere to formal tech-
nology transfer policies and procedures. Third, Ethics
Committees supervise ethical standards and make sure
that PIs comply with the norms and values of the uni-
versity as well as their professional scientific communi-
ties. TTOs only have limited control over the PI, which
in turn can result in suboptimal allocations of resources
and an overall loss in welfare. Despite institutionalized
monitoring and control systems, universities need to
provide PIs adequate research autonomy and balance
this against appropriate IP protection systems in order to
increase efficient value creation processes that capture
the benefits for relevant entrepreneurial ecosystem ac-
tors. PIs need to invest in building their reputation to
signal their capabilities.
The industry actor in the entrepreneurial ecosystem is
becoming an increasingly important collaborator for PIs,
especially SMEs. These entrepreneurial ecosystem ac-
tors are one of the main recipients of disruptive knowl-
edge that can have direct benefit on their firm. Together
with public and private capital providers such as public
research funding agencies or venture capitalists, industry
mainly contributes financial support to the research
project. Reversely, the implication is that all financiers
focus on financial controls. Moreover, industry partners
can contribute other physical factors like equipment,
labor, and production or testing space. In return, they
expect new disruptive knowledge and the access to
expertise or as described by Stam (2015) Bproductive
entrepreneurship.^ SMEs engage in publicly funded
programs to absorb new knowledge and get access to
expertise, as they do not have the internal resources or
capacity. For all industry actors, the main monitoring
mechanism is financial and this may not be of a sufficient
scale to engage the interest of PIs. By their resource
acquisition skills and their managerial responsiveness,
PIs deal with imposed managerial tensions and thus
enable efficient value creation processes within the
respective research projects, based on their envisioning,
strategizing, and value creation capabilities. Openness to
technology change constitutes a prerequisite for
respective collaborations as economic and non-
economic value can only be created by the application
of new knowledge. The imperfect contract nature of
publicly funded programs can facilitate this openness.
A lack of sufficient resources might result in suboptimal
value creation processes, some entrepreneurial ecosys-
tem actors bearing more of the costs. To ensure the
adequate disclosure of new disruptive knowledge, the
distribution of intellectual property rights has to be
agreed before the actual project start, i.e., ex ante. As
public-private partnerships are primarily based on col-
laborative research, firms still have to ensure some re-
search autonomy for the PI. In this context, the reputation
of PIs serves as a good signal to sustain the autonomy
that they require to advance their research efforts and to
act as an entrepreneurial actor.
Private capital providers are solely interested in fi-
nancial returns, the main benefit, whereas public
funding agencies focus on scientific reporting as well
as a research governance reported by the PI and the
value for money. Both types of capital providers have
to avoid two governance dilemmas related to the PI:
firstly, Badverse selection^—problems in the early stage
could lead to the funding of suboptimal projects or
optimal projects with suboptimal leadership. Secondly,
Bmoral hazard^—behavior by the PI jeopardizes the
expected rewards and benefits. Especially the timely
delivery of publicly funded programs is important for
the funding agency. Thus, capital providers consistently
require updates of reports, providing them insights into
the current project status, completed milestones, upcom-
ing activities, and actual and projected benefits. Al-
though reports need to be information-dense, they must
not constitute administrative burdens that add additional
costs to entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. This can ac-
tually constrain the PI to engage in value creating
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activities, i.e., conducting research, allocating resources,
boundary spanning activities, etc.
The government, thus public policy, expects multiple
benefits and rewards. Policymakers focus on economic
impacts like new start-ups and job creation, economic
stimuli sent by licensed new knowledge and technolo-
gies as well as the implementation of science and SME
policies in general. These targets are abstract at the
beginning of funded projects and therefore; moral haz-
ard could dominate the relation between the PI and the
policymaker. Public policies set the basis for sufficient
intellectual property protection mechanisms, thus are
critical drivers in establishing optimal governance sys-
tems. As government development agencies are inter-
ested in scientific breakthroughs, PIs should be encour-
aged to conduct collaborative research, enabling PIs to
think outside the box, i.e., pool different knowledge
sources to open up and reach new technological fron-
tiers. This potentially expands the boundaries of existing
entrepreneurial ecosystems as well as delivering disrup-
tive knowledge.
Combining all actors in entrepreneurial ecosystems
and taking their multiple objectives and expected re-
wards into account, the PI as a key player can reduce
complexity by navigating through the funded research
project to deliver the envisaged benefits. As scientists in
the PI role, they bring together different entrepreneurial
ecosystem actors and are typically the first contact per-
son for research organizations, industry, capital pro-
viders, and policy. Since the importance of various
actors as well as the significance of respective collabo-
rations changes over time, the interaction with PIs is
iterative and dynamic, hence not linear (as indicated by
the bold arrow in Fig. 1). Whereas the interaction with
e.g. capital providers is rather intense in the project
initiation phase, the PI subsequently mainly engages
with industry to create economic and non-economic
value, but still has to report to capital providers also in
the ongoing phases until project completion.
All entrepreneurial ecosystem actors monitor and
control the PIs’ activities, but their mechanisms are
ambiguous: control instruments and reports should be
used as a means to an end and not an end in itself to
minimize costs. Besides the discussed monitoring op-
portunities, PIs use signaling to convince other entre-
preneurial ecosystem actors that they have the best
intention to reach all targets, e.g., disclose new technol-
ogies and ideas, commercialize knowledge within the
agreed framework, etc. Signals are the results of the
agent’s previous actions and are only valuable if they
are visible and verifiable. Successfully completed pro-
jects, patent applications, or scientific publications are
suitable signals for certain actors, whereby it should be
noted that all these measurable outputs are reducible to
the PI’s capabilities. PIs need to have capabilities that
enable them to operate, engage, and mobilize the nec-
essary resources and support to fulfill publicly funded
project commitments, realize their own scientific ambi-
tions, and in doing so, create influence over their own
research space while adhering to different governance
mechanisms. Information asymmetries have to be re-
duced to enable efficient value creation processes. Both
the principal as well as the agent of every bilateral
governance relationship within entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems have to engage in removing obstacles to value
creation, as respective objectives can only be reached
by jointly addressing prevalent problem categories.
6 Conclusion and future research avenues
The purpose and contribution of our paper is to present a
micro level PI-centered governance framework, which
is in contrast to the macro level frameworks posited in
the literature. In presenting our framework, we also
address some of the criticisms of entrepreneurial eco-
systems and in doing so identify the value creation
(benefits), PI capabilities, the problem categories
(costs), and solving mechanisms that PIs can use to
govern effectively and efficiently large-scale publicly
funded research programs. Our paper has highlighted
the influential role that scientists play in the PI role in
contributing to the development and growth of entre-
preneurial ecosystems and the multitude of actors. Our
framework highlights the governance mechanisms; PIs
have to navigate effectively to deliver publicly funded
research programs based on imperfect contracts within
entrepreneurial ecosystems that allocate costs and ben-
efits to relevant entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. Our
framework addresses some of the criticisms of entrepre-
neurial ecosystems research to date and makes the fol-
lowing contributions.
First, our micro level approach from a PI perspective
is a modest attempt to develop an operational level
understanding of entrepreneurial ecosystem as
highlighted by Stam and Bosma (2015). We do this by
focusing on the PI capabilities, value creation (benefits),
the problem categories (costs), and solving mechanisms
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relevant for each entrepreneurial ecosystem actor from
an individual perspective—that of the PI. Second, Stam
and Spigel (2015) suggest that there is no clarity about
cause and effect in relation to specific factors and the
units of analysis and attribution of contributory factors
for economic outcomes. Our micro level PI-centered
governance framework attempts to address this by map-
ping out the cause and effect by suggesting different
value creation indicators for each entrepreneurial eco-
system actor relevant to the PI as well as the problem
categories and solving mechanisms that PIs experience
and use in the governance of large-scale publicly funded
research. PIs mobilize different entrepreneurial ecosys-
tem actors to create new projects, and in doing so,
arbitrate and allocate costs and benefits. Future studies
might thus operationalize our framework. Our third
contribution lies around existing studies using different
network definitions, being place-/cluster-based and con-
ceptualizing frameworks that are static and do not ac-
count for the evolution over time (see Alvedalen and
Boschma 2017). Our proposed framework overcomes
the network definitional problem by taking the unit of
analysis at the individual level and focusing on one of
the influential actors that generates disruptive knowl-
edge—one of the core elements of an entrepreneurial
ecosystem. Moreover, focusing on the PI means that our
proposed model is not place-/cluster-based, considering
the time-based, dynamic, and iterative aspects of pub-
licly funded large-scale projects.
Future studies can use cross-country programs such
as Horizon 2020, European Research Council PI grant
holders as well as national funded PIs as their unit of
analysis. The focus at the PI and project level can be
used to examine the evolution of entrepreneurial eco-
system through the prism of large-scale publicly funded
research. The very nature of publicly funded programs
means they are not static but rather dynamic as they
evolve over time. Our conceptual model overcomes the
static nature of entrepreneurial ecosystem frameworks
as our proposed framework allows for time evolution
and the weighting of entrepreneurial ecosystem actors’
importance during the different project phases.
For the economic advancement and the contribution
to the productive capital of an entrepreneurial ecosys-
tem, PIs need to possess capabilities to lead, manage,
reconcile, and govern scientific targets with benefits
such as economic and non-economic value creation.
Through their boundary spanning activities and their
ability to envision and strategize, PIs leverage actors
and resources to create disruptive knowledge and enable
other entrepreneurial ecosystem actors to capture value.
The underlying governance dilemma at a micro level of
entrepreneurial ecosystems is that different stake-
holders, i.e., principals such as research organizations
or capital providers, are competing if not attempting to
assert primary control over the agent, i.e., the PI as the
supplier of disruptive knowledge. PIs consequently
have to deal with different forms of control mechanisms
and become proficient in navigating, arbitrating, and
managing these control mechanisms in order to create
and generate benefits and value for all relevant entre-
preneurial ecosystem actors at a project level. Moreover,
PIs have to create their own governance systems at the
project level as well as navigate institutional governance
systems to fulfill their scientific mission and add eco-
nomic and non-economic value to relevant entrepre-
neurial ecosystems.
How PIs navigate the different governance mecha-
nisms matters and can constrain the benefits and value
creation for entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. More-
over, how PIs efficiently and effectively deliver on
publicly funded large-scale multi-stakeholder projects
matters particularly as they are agents for funding agen-
cies and other government agents in supporting and
developing SME competitiveness. SMEs have limited
influence over universities in comparison to larger firms
so engaging with PIs using public funding is necessary
for them to access disruptive knowledge, human capital,
and expertise.
Finally, this paper emphasized the importance of
taking a PI-centered approach in viewing entrepreneur-
ial ecosystems, given the influential role and founda-
tional importance of PIs to the vibrancy and sustainabil-
ity of entrepreneurial ecosystems. Our PI-centered ap-
proach opens up several fruitful avenues of future re-
search in at least three distinct research fields: the PI
literature, the entrepreneurial ecosystem literature as
well as the governance literature.
From a PI literature perspective, there is a need to
conduct empirical research on how PIs actually arbi-
trate, navigate, shape, and circumvent the complex gov-
ernance systems they engage in at a micro perspective as
presented in our Fig. 1. Future studies should consider
the potential differences across universities, funding
agencies, and institutional settings and should investi-
gate how PIs deploy their capabilities to achieve the
desired benefits for entrepreneurial ecosystem actors.
Moreover, research on what signals PIs actually send
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as an agent to different actors in a principal position that
afford them more autonomy and at what stage this
signaling becomes effective with multiple principals is
needed. Empirical studies are warranted on how PIs
understand and deal with moral hazard and adverse
selection problem categories and how this varies across
disciplines and types of institutional settings. Address-
ing these research themes will further advance the en-
trepreneurial ecosystem research, particularly from the
individual perspective as identified and advocated by
Stam (2015).
From an entrepreneurial ecosystem literature per-
spective, it is critical to investigate the influence of the
competitive positing of an entrepreneurial ecosystem
actor on the role as a principal. Moreover, the active or
passive role of an ecosystem actor might influence its
tendency to shape and control agents such as PIs. The
role of public policy-shaping entrepreneurial behavior
and thus relationships within entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems is another very fruitful area of future research.
Finally, with the growth influence of virtual ecosystems,
principal-agent roles should be analyzed more in depth.
From a governance literature perspective, insights
from classical agency research addressing relationships
between managers and owners of firms should be ana-
lyzed and transferred toward bilateral governance rela-
tionships in entrepreneurial ecosystems. Especially bilat-
eral contracts and their mechanisms to avoid Badverse
selection^ and overcome Bmoral hazard^ behavior of
agents should be the focus of future research, taking
the important role of PIs into consideration. Incentive
as well as control structures that are established in private
sector organizations have at least potential to be helpful
in the public sector, too. Empirical investigations on how
the actors in entrepreneurial ecosystems actually deal
with the identified problem categories and which mech-
anisms are beneficial to increase economic and non-
economic value creation would thereby enrich the gov-
ernance literature. Efficient signaling and reporting struc-
tures could avoid agency costs and the resulting welfare
loss and consequently help to create a more valuable and
transparent entrepreneurial ecosystem.
Taking a PI-centered approach to future studies of
entrepreneurial ecosystem is essential as PIs are agents
for entrepreneurial ecosystem actors and their effective-
ness matters to contributing to the functioning, vibrancy,
development, and growth of entrepreneurial ecosys-
tems. This paper outlines a governance framework that
integrates distinct research fields associated with
economic and non-economic value creation processes
in entrepreneurial ecosystems to improve bilateral gov-
ernance relationships that aims at motivating other re-
searchers to focus their attention on public sector actors
such as PIs.
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